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1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with what causes a bare plural NP to be 
interpreted generically in examples like (la), and existentially in 
examples like (lb) and (lc) - a question raised and discussed by Diesing 
(1992a).
(l)a. Sharks are dangerous.
b. Sharks are visible.
c. Sharks are following a young seal.
Section 2 of the paper will briefly summarize Diesing's theory, which 
derives the generic or existential interpretation of a bare plural 
subject from the individual-level or stage-level character of its 
predicate, and will point out various problems in her proposal. Section 
3 will put forth an alternative account of the facts illustrated in (1). 
It will be shown that generic and existential bare plural NPs differ in 
their specificity feature: the former are [+specific], and the latter 
are [-specific]. It is this difference in specificity, in interaction 
with an independently motivated specificity condition on Topicalization, 
that predicts the distribution of generic and existential bare plurals 
within the sentence. As for the correlation between the interpretation 
of bare plurals and the typology of predicates, the class of predicates 
licensing an existential bare plural subject will turn out not to be 
coextensive with the class of stage-level predicates, contrary to 
Diesing's claim. The existential interpretation of a bare plural is 
allowed in the presence of predicates expressing existence, and in the
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presence of eventive predicates - presumably because it is these types 
of predicates that can provide the binder that a [-specific] indefinite
NP needs. Existential predicates have been claimed to have an EXIST 
meaning component that can function as a logical operator of existence 
(see Szabolcsi (1986)). Eventive predicates, on the other hand, are 
known to be associated with an existential guantifier which binds (non 
selectively) their event variable (see Davidson (1967)). Predicates 
which neither mean existence, nor have an event variable (that is, 
essentially non-existential stative predicates) can take a [-specific] 
argument only if it is bound by a focus operator.
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a2. Diesing's Theory
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As Diesing (1992a; 1992b) observed, the bare plural NP has a generic
interpretation in (la), and an existential reading in (lb) or (lc). (la 
and (lb) are to be mapped into the following logical representations, 
respectively:
(2)a. Genx [x is a shark] x is dangerous
b. Ex x a shark /\ x is visible
The generic interpretation of the bare plural NP in (2a) is a 
consequence of the fact that the NP is bound by a generic operator. The 
existential interpretation of the bare plural NP in (2b), on the other
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hand, arises from the existential closure of the given NP. Whether a 0
bare plural NP is subject to binding by a generic operator or is subject 
to existential closure in logical representation derives from its LF- 
position - given the following assumptions:
Dn(3) Interpretation Requirement
3Bare plurals are variables that must be bound by one of the 
following:
a. an overt operator (such as an adverb of quantification)
b. the abstract operator Gen (generic reading)
c. existential closure (existential reading) where the domain of 
existential closure is the VP, and Gen binds all variables that 
appear outside the VP (forming the restrictive clause)
As a consequence of this interpretation requirement, a bare plural 
NP occupying a VP-external position at LF will receive a generic 
interpretation, whereas a bare plural NP occupying a VP-internal 
position at LF will be assigned an existential reading.
The LF position of a subject, in turn, is claimed by Diesing to 
depend on the individual-level or stage-level character of its 
predicate. The correlation is summarized as follows:
(4) Stacre-ZIndividual/Level Contrast
Subjects of stage-level predicates can be mapped into 
either [Spec,IP] or [Spec,VP]. Subjects of individual- 
level predicates must stay in [Spec,IP].
(Diesing (1992a, p. 367)
Diesing derives this generalization by stipulating different kinds of 
inflection heads (AGRg) for stage-level and individual-level predicates. 
The Infl associated with stage-level predicates is of the 'raising' 
type: it does not assign a theta-role to [Spec,IP]. The subject of a 
stage-level predicate is base-generated in [Spec,VP], but in English, it 
must raise to [Spec,IP] at S-structure to receive Case. At LF, it either 
can be lowered into its D-structure position, or can remain in 
[Spec,IP]. Consequently, the bare plural subject of a stage-level
4predicate is predicted to be potentially ambiguous: it can receive 
existential interpretation when lowered into [Spec,VP], or it can be 
generic when remaining in [Spec,IP]. Individual-level predicates, on the 
other hand, are associated with a 'control' type Infl, which assigns a 
theta-role to [Spec,IP] (the theta-role 'has the property x', where x is 
the property expressed by the predicate). The lexical NP in [Spec,IP] 
controls a PRO subject in [Spec,VP], which is assigned a theta-role by 
the verb. Since [Spec,IP] is assigned a theta-role of its own, the 
subject in [Spec,IP] cannot be lowered into [Spec,VP] in LF. Hence the 
bare plural subject of an individual-level predicate is invariably 
mapped into the restrictive clause of a generic operator, obtaining 
generic interpretation.
Below I will argue that Diesing's theory is fairly 'costly', 
introducing otherwise unmotivated assumptions; it does not cover all the 
relevant facts; and it also makes a number of wrong predictions.
Diesing's theory complicates the machinery of syntax by 
introducing - without any independent motivation - an additional kind of 
Infl (AGRS): a control-type Infl associated with individual-level 
predicates, as well as a new theta role: that assigned by this kind of 
Infl to its subject position.
Point (c) of the Interpretation Requirement in (3), stating that 
the domain of existential closure is the VP, and all variables that 
appear outside the VP are bound by a Gen(eric) operator, forces the 
stipulation of invisible object scrambling. The assumptions in (3c) have 
the consequence that a bare plural NP that is inside the VP at LF cannot 
receive a generic interpretation. In fact, however, bare plural objects 
can, and often must, be interpreted generically. For example:
(5) Mary hates sharks.
5Diesing claims that the object in (5) occupies a VP-external position at 
LF; it has been scrambled into a position dominated by IP. The 
assumption of LF scrambling, however, is not only stipulative; it also 
runs into a difficulty in the case of German. Consider an example:
(6) ...weil kein Fischer Haifische hasst
because no fisherman sharks hates
It is claimed that in the German embedded clause the kein phrase stands 
at the head of the VP, since kein results from the merger of a VP- 
external nicht and the determiner of an adjacent VP-internal indefinite 
NP - see Kratzer (1989). Hence the generic bare plural following the 
kein phrase is undoubtedly in the VP at S-structure. The Interpretation 
Requirement requires that it be moved into an IP-dominated position in 
LF. However, the fact that it is moved only at LF violates the Earliness 
Principle of Pesetsky (1989), stating that constraints on 
representations must be satisfied as early as possible on the hierarchy 
of levels. This is problematic because the constraint imposed by the 
Earliness Principle on the Interpretation Requirement in (3) is 
indispensable for Diesing elsewhere: in the derivation of the S- 
structure position of German bare plural subjects. In German embedded 
clauses, distributional evidence: the position of the subject relative 
to sentential particles appearing at the VP-boundary such as ja doch, 
indicates that an existentially interpreted bare plural subject, e.g. 
that in (7a) , is internal to the VP, and a generically interpreted bare 
plural subject, e.g. that in (7b), is external to it at S-Structure 
already.
6(7)a. ... dass ja doch Ameisen meine Viola da Gamba zerstören
that ants my viola da gamba destroy
I that Ants are destroying my viola da gamba'
b. ... dass Ameisen ja doch sechs Beine haben
that ants six legs have
that ants have six legs
In German, where Case requirements do not force the extraction of a 
subject generated in Spec,VP into Spec,IP, the extraction of the 
generically interpreted subject of a stage-level predicate is made 
obligatory at S-structure by the Earliness Principle. It remains 
unexplained why the Interpretation Requirement is subject to the 
Earliness Principle in the case of German bare plural subjects, but not 
in the case of German bare plural objects.
Bare plural objects represent a problem for Diesing's theory from 
another perspective, as well. The existential or generic interpretation 
of a bare plural object, too, depends on the type of its predicate (see 
Laca (1990)) - just as the existential or generic interpretation of a 
bare plural subject does. Thus in (8a) the predicate hate requires that 
its bare plural object be interpreted generically, whereas in (8b), the 
predicate make requires that its bare plural object be understood 
existentially - at least in its most neutral interpretation.
(8)a. Bosses hate mistakes, 
b. Bosses make mistakes.
In the case of subjects, the correlation between the interpretation of 
the bare plural NP and the predicate is stipulated to be mediated by 
Infl (AGRg). This account obviously does not extend to bare plural 
objects. However, (8a,b) represent a contrast exactly like that in
7(la,b); if (8a,b) and (la,b) cannot be given a unified account, a 
generalization is likely to have been missed.
Diesing (1992a), in fact, claims to derive the correlation between 
the classification of predicates and the interpretation of bare plural 
subjects. As I will point out below, the predictions her theory makes 
are empirically inadequate also within this domain. The problems arise, 
in part, from the fact that the generalization that the theory intends 
to derive, namely, that the bare plural subject of a stage-level 
predicate can be either existential or generic, whereas the bare plural 
subject of an individual-level predicate is always generic, is spurious. 
Here are a number of facts contradicting it:
i. Individual-level predicates do allow an existentially interpreted VP- 
internal subject if it is contrastively focussed. In example (9a), the 
contrastive focus reading is elicited by a superlative, whereas in (9b) , 
by an only associated with the subject.
(9)a. GIRLS know mathematics the best in my school, 
b. In this village, only WOMEN have blue eyes.
Both subjects are, in fact, ambiguous (or perhaps vague); thus girls can 
mean either the kind 'girls', or an unidentified subset of girls. Under 
the latter, existential interpretation of the subject, (9a) can be true 
also in a situation in which there are only two girls out of several 
hundred who know matematics better than all the boys of the school. 
Similarly, (9b) can also be true about a village in which only a 
minority of women, but none of the men have blue eyes. In Diesing's 
theory, the non-generic readings cannot be derived. Since these bare 
plural subjects are subjects associated with individual-level 
predicates, they are generated in [Spec,IP], where they are subject to
8binding by Gen. Since their theta-role is different from that of the PRO 
occupying [Spec,VP], they cannot be lowered into [Spec,VP].
ii. There are individual-level predicates - those expressing existence 
(in a particular fashion and/or in a particular location) - that can 
also take a non-contrastive existentially interpreted bare plural 
subject. For example:
(10) a. Volcanoes line both sides of the river.
b. Ancient figures are carved on the walls of the cave.
c. In this area, hot springs exist.
d. Fish abound in the lake.
Apparently, predicates meaning 'exist (in a particular fashion and/or in 
a particular location)' always allow a [-specific] subject, whether its 
existence in the given fashion/location is temporary or permanent. 
Diesing's theory provides no means of identifying these predicates and 
deriving the existential reading of their subject.
iii. There are stage-level predicates that do not allow a non- 
contrastive existentially interpreted bare plural subject. Such are 
almost all adjectival predicates. For example:
(11) a. Children are noisy in the street, 
b. Dishes were dirty.
Even though these predicates express temporary, stage-level properties, 
their subjects cannot be interpreted existentially - unless they are 
contrastively focussed, as in (12a,b). Recall, however, that all
9predicates, also individual-level ones, allow a non-generic bare plural 
subject if it is contrasted.
(12) a. CHILDREN are noisy in the yard, not ADULTS, 
b. DISHES were dirty, not CUTLERY.
(12a,b) are parallel to (13duv (12a,b) are parallel to (13), in which
subject of an individual-level adjectival predicate is assigned a non­
generic reading:
(13) In my class, only GIRLS are good at mathematics.
'The persons who are good at mathematics in my class happen to be 
girls.'
Notice that the verbal predicate corresponding to noisy does allow the 
existential reading of its bare plural subject also in case it is not 
contrastively focussed:
(14) Children are making noise in the yard.
The adjectival predicates allowing a non-focussed existentially 
interpreted bare subject, on which Diesing's theory is based: available 
and visible. belong to a small subclass of adjectives. Whereas most 
adjectival predicates denote the physical, mental or emotional state of 
the referent of their subject, available and visible express, at least 
in one of their meanings, its existence. That is, they presumably 
pattern with the verbal predicates expressing existence, illustrated in 
(10), which can take an existential bare plural subject even if they are 
of the individual-level type.
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Drunk, naked. and perhaps also sick and hungry also appear to 
allow, at least marginally, a non-contrastive existentially interpreted 
bare plural subject. For example:
(15) a. Students were drunk/naked in the pub. 
b.?Children were hungry/sick.
There is evidence, however, that in (15a,b) the main predicate is not 
the adjective but the existential predicate be. As Emonds (1976, p. 108) 
demonstrated, the adjectives drunk. naked, and marginally also hungry 
and sick can have the sense, and share the position, of circumstantial 
PPs. In such cases they obviously do not function as primary predicates. 
Compare:
(16) a. Jane is very witty drunk. 
b.*Jane is drunk very witty.
In Hungarian, the equivalent of drunk in (16a) is an adjectival stem 
obligatorily supplied with an adverbializing suffix:
(17) a. Janka részeg.
Jane drunk 
'Jane is drunk.'
b. Janka nagyon szellemes részeg-en/*részeg.
Whereas an adjectival predicate allows no copula in present 3rd person 
singular in Hungarian, an adverbialized adjective must accompany an
Jane very witty drunk-ADV/ drunk
Jane is very witty drunk.
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overt verbal predicate (which may also be the existential predicate be). 
Compare:
(18) a. Gyerekek (*vannak) meztelen-ek.
children are naked -PL
'Children are naked.' 
b. Gyerekek *(vannak) meztelen-ül. 
children are naked -ADV
'Children are naked.'
In past tense, in which the copula must also be spelled out, the fact 
that the adjectival predicate accompanies a copula whereas the adverbial 
accompanies a verbal predicate of existence does not lead to an overt 
difference:
(19) a. Gyerekek voltak meztelen-ek.
children were naked -PL
'Children were naked.' 
b. Gyerekek voltak meztelen-ül. 
children were naked -ADV
'Children were naked.'
There is, nevertheless, a crucial fact distinguishing (19a) from (19b): 
whereas (19a), containing an adjectival predicate, requires its bare 
plural subject to be interpreted as a contrastive focus, (19b), 
containing a verbal predicate of existence and an adverbial secondary 
predicate also allows it to be understood non-contrastively. The non- 
contrastive bare plural subject of (19b) is obviously licensed by the 
existential verbal predicate of the sentence. The English (15a,b) must 
represent similar cases: their primary predicate, licensing a non-
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contrastive existential bare plural subject, is a verbal predicate of 
existence, and the adjectives function as secondary predicates.
Given the wrong predictions that Diesing's theory makes, discussed 
in (i), (ii) and (iii), the claim that the distribution of generic and 
existential NPs depends on whether their predicate is individual-level, 
associated with a control type Infl, or stage-level, associated with a 
raising typf Infl, needs to be revised.
3. An alternative account
In this section, I will propose an alternative explanation of the facts 
observed by Diesing, which accounts for a wider range of data, in an 
empirically more adequate way.
The explanation to be proposed is based on the claim that 
generically and existentially interpreted bare plurals differ in their 
specificity feature: whereas generic bare plurals are [+specific], 
existential are plurals are [-specific].
I assume the specificity notion of Enc (1991). She defines 
specificity in the framework proposed by Heim (1982) for the description 
of definiteness. In Heim's theory, an NP is definite if its referential 
index is familiar, and an NP is indefinite if its referential index is 
novel. According to Enc, an NP also carries an additional index, which 
expresses the familiarity or novelty of a discourse referent to which 
the referent of the NP bears a subset relation. An NP is [+specific] if 
its second index is familiar, that is, if the referent of the NP bears a 
subset relation to the referent of an NP previously introduced into the 
domain of discourse. A definite NP, whose referent always bears an 
identity relation (an extreme case of a subset relation) to a referent 
already present in the domain of discourse, is necessarily [+specific]. 
An indefinite NP, on the other hand, is only specific if it has a
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partitive reading, that is, if its referent is included in the referent 
of an NP previously introduced into the domain of discourse.
Compare the following texts:
(20) a. Men between 25 and 40 reported themselves at their respective
district headquarters on Sept. 1st. Doctors were available, 
b. Men between 25 and 40 reported themselves at their respective 
district headquarters on Sept. 1st. Doctors wore white overalls.
If in (20a), doctors is interpreted existentially, its referent cannot 
represent a subset of the referent of men between 25-40. In (15b), in 
the unmarked interpretation of which doctors is generic, on the other 
hand, the referent of doctors can very well represent a subset of the 
referent of men between 25-40. That is, assuming the specificity 
definition of Enc (1991), the existentially interpreted bare plural in 
(20a) is [-specific], whereas the generically interpreted bare plural in 
(20b) is [+specific].
The specificity feature of an NP can also be tested syntactically. 
Thus an object represented by a [+specific] NP is 'pronominalized' by a 
definite pronoun, whereas an object represented by a [-specific NP] is 
'pronominalized' by an indefinite pronoun. Let us compare pronominal 
reference to the generic bare plural object of like. and to the 
existential bare plural object of buy:
(21) a. Mary likes cats, and Susan likes them, too.
b. Mary is feeding cats, and Susan is feeding some, too.
If we used a definite pronoun in the second clause of (21b), the second 
clause would not mean the same that the first one for most speakers: the 
pronoun would denote not a newly introduced set of cats but the set of
14
cats mentioned in the first clause. If definite pronouns are inherently 
[+specific], which is likely, and if a pronoun 'pronominalizing' an NP 
in a coordinated construction shares the specificity feature of its 
antecedent, which is plausible, then the facts in (21) show the generic 
cats of (21a) to be [+specific], and the existential cats of (21b) to be 
[-specific].
An indefinite NP in the c-command domain of an operator can have 
wide scope with respect to the given operator only if the NP is 
[+specific] - cf. Enc (1991). A generic bare plural can have scope over 
a c-commanding quantifier or modal, which is evidence of its specificity 
- see (22a) and (23a) ; an existential bare plural, on the other hand, 
can be assigned only narrow scope, which indicates its non-specificity - 
see (22b) and (23b).
(22) a. Many people like books, 
b. Many people bought books.
(23) a. Mary wants children to be happy,
b. Mary wants children to be invited.
(22a) means that books in general are such that many people like them; 
that is, the generic books has scope over many - as is expected in the
case of a [+specific] NP. (22b) , on the other hand, means that for many
people there were possibly different sets of books that they bought; 
that is, the existentially interpreted books is necessarily in the scope 
of many people - which falls out if it is a non-specific NP. Similarly, 
the generic subject of to be happy has scope over the verb want, that 
is, (23a) means: 'Children in general are such that Mary wants them to 
be happy'. In (23b), on the other hand, the existential bare plural 
subject of to be invited has narrow scope with respect to want. that is,
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the sentence means: 'Mary wants that there be a set of children 
invited.'1 The wide scope of the generic bare plural NP in (23a) falls 
out if it is [+specific], whereas the necessarily narrow scope of the 
existential bare plural NP in (23b) is predicted if it is [-specific].
In sum: the semantic and syntactic facts discussed in connection 
with (20-23) lead to the same conclusion: generic and existential bare 
plural NPs differ in their specificity feature; the former are 
[+specific], and the latter are [-specific].
This conclusion predicts Diesing's observation that only 
existential bare plurals allow subextraction in German: extraction out 
of a [+specific] generic bare plural is ruled out by the Specificity 
Condition of Fiengo and Higginbotham (1980).
I claim that it is determined by the specificity feature of a bare 
plural NP which syntactic positions it can take within the sentence.
It has been common knowledge since the early descriptions of 
topic-prominent languages (cf. e.g. Kuno (1972), or É. Kiss (1981)) that 
Topicalizattion is subject to a specificity condition, namely:
(24) Specificity Condition
A topicalized NP is [+specific].
This condition need not be stipulated; it is a consequence of the fact 
that the semantic function of the topic is to forground a referent 
already present in the domain of discourse, for it to serve as the 
subject of the subsequent predication. In the theory of Enc (1991), a 
[+specific] NP differs from a [-specific] one precisely in that the 
referent of a [+specific] NP is already present (as the subset of a 
previously introduced referent) in the domain of discourse.
Notice that Topicalization in topic-prominent languages also 
subsumes Subject Movement: a Predicte-Phrase-external subject and a 
Predicate-Phrase-external non-subject argument share the same position 
(see e.g. É. Kiss (1986) for Hungarian, or Vallduvi (1993) for Catalan).
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That is, under this interpretation, the term Topicalization covers the 
following type of transformation:
(25) Topicalization
Topicalization is the movement of an argument out of a Predicate 
Phrase (the VP, or a V-related functional projection) in order to 
create a predication relation between the moved argument and the 
Predicate Phrase containing its trace.2
As a consequence of (24), in Hungarian an indefinite NP can only 
be topicalized if it can be attributed a [+specific], partitive reading. 
Compare (26a) with (27).
(26) a. ?? [ip0pp Egy ismeretlen ember j_ [jp be- csengetett tjj]
an unknown person PERF rang
'An unknown person rang the bell.' 
cf. b. [jp Be-csengetett egy ismeretlen ember]
(27) Sokan álltak a kapu előtt, 
many stood the gate before
'Many persons stood in front of the door.'
[TopP E(3Y ismeretlen ember^ [jp be- csengetett t jj ] 
an unknown person PERF rang
'An unknown person rang the bell.'
That is, a topicalized indefinite is unacceptable unless its referent 
represents a subset of an already familiar referent, in other words, if 
it is interpreted as [+specific].
Generic plurals, which are definite in Hungarian, are naturally 
topicalizable - see (28a,b,c); existential plurals, on the other hand,
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are not - see (28d), as their Topicalization would violate the 
Specificity Condition in (24).
(28) a. [TopP A kutyák [jp meg- ugatják az idegeneket t-jJ] 
the dogs PERF bark the strangers
'Dogs bark at strangers.'
b. [TopP Az idegeneket^ [IP meg- ugatják tj_ a kutyák] 
'Strangers, dogs bark at.'
c. [TopP Az idegeneket-^ a kutyákj [IP meg- ugatják tj t jj ] 
'Strangers, dogs bark at.'
o.*[TopP K u t y á k [jP meg- ugatták az idegeneket tjj ] 
dogs PERF barked the strangers
'Dogs barked at the strangers.' 
cf. d. [jP Kutyák ugatták meg az idegeneket]
That is, as a consequence of condition (24), existential plurals are 
confined to Predicate-Phrase- (i.e., IP-) internal position. On the 
other hand, nothing constrains the distribution of generic plurals - as 
is also clear from (28a,b), which contain both a PredP-external and a 
PredP-internal generic plural.
Subject Movement into the external subject position in English, 
and in German embedded clauses is a special case of Topicalization as 
interpreted above, with a restriction imposed on its target; hence it is 
also subject to the Specificity Condition in (24). (Assuming the 
standard English sentence structure, condition (24) applies in English 
only at LF - presumably by constraining movement into Spec,RefP, a 
projection dominating IP, as proposed by Stowell and Beghelli (1994). In 
fact, É. Kiss (1994) presents a large amount of - mainly distributional 
- evidence indicating that specific and non-specific subjects occupy two 
different S-structure positions, the former outside IP, and latter in
18
Spec,IP, in the English sentence, too.) If the distribution of generic 
and existential bare plurals is, indeed, constrained by condition (24) 
in topic-prominent and subject-prominent languages alike, then we 
predict for both language types that generic plurals have a free 
distribution across sentence positions, whereas existential plurals are 
confined to the Predicate Phrase. This is precisely what we attested in 
the German and Hungarian examples discussed above (and, according to É. 
Kiss (1994), this is what we attest in English, too).3
To check the correctness of the proposed account of the sentence- 
internal distribution of generic and existential bare plurals, let us 
consider some German data. Kratzer (1989) observed that there are two 
types of indefinite objects in German: those that can scramble out of 
the VP, and those that cannot. Scrambling and Subject Movement in the 
German embedded clause are sub-types of the Topicalization 
transformation defined in (25); hence they are subject to the 
Specificity Condition in (24). As predicted by the Specificity 
Condition, the objects that can scramble out of the VP are those that 
can, or must, be analyzed as [+specific]. The objects that cannot 
scramble, on the other hand, are [-specific]. Compare sentences (64a) 
and (65a) of Kratzer (1989), rewritten below as (29a,b). The boundary of 
the VP is indicated by nicht.
(29)a.*Wenn ein Beweis einen Fehler nicht [yp enthält] 
if a proof a mistake not contains
b. Wenn ein Kritiker einen Film nicht [yp mag] 
if a critic a movie not likes
The object of mögen 'like' in (29b) must be interpreted as [+specific] 
(for reasons to be discussed below); einen Film means 'a certain film'. 
The indefinite object that cannot be scrambled out of the VP in (29a),
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on the other hand, is [-specific]; it does not denote a particular 
mistake. If we force a specific interpretation upon it by previously 
introducing a set of mistakes into the domain of discourse, the sentence 
will become grammatical. Assume a situation in which teachers correcting 
a mathematics test receive the instructions in (30a):
(30)a. The students are likely to commit the following three 
mistakes in the proof:...
b. Wenn ein Beweis einen Fehler nicht [yp enthält], ist 
if a proof a mistake not contains, is
er passabel, 
it passable
'If a proof does not contain a mistake [one of the mistakes], it 
can pass.'
The grammatical (30b) differs from the ungrammatical (29a) only in that 
einen Fehler in (30b) is [+specific] in the sense of Enc (1991): its 
referent is a subset of a previously introduced set of referents. This 
fact is clear evidence of the role of Specificity Condition (24) in 
licensing 'scrambling' out of the German VP.
In fact, Diesing (1992b) also claims that 'presuppositionality' (a 
notion close to 'specificity') plays a role in determining word order, 
in as much as only presuppositional (strong) quantifiers are adjoined to 
IP by Quantifier-Raising at LF; weak quantifiers remain within the VP. 
This claim fits in with Diesing's Mapping Hypothesis, stating that the 
VP-external part of an LF representation is mapped into the restrictive 
clause of the corresponding tripartite semantic structure, as it is the 
restrictive clause that is known to accomodate the presuppositions of a 
quantified sentence. Scrambling out of the VP in English and German are 
claimed to be instances of Quantifier-Raising; hence they are predicted
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to affect only presuppositional expressions. Generic bare plurals, 
though not strictly presuppositional, pattern with presuppositional 
indefinites in that they also undergo Quantifier-Raising. Non- 
presuppositional existential bare plurals cannot be Q-raised.
This reasoning is not supported by facts of languages in which 
Quantifier-Raising takes place visibly, at S-structure, like Hungarian. 
First, in Hungarian both presuppositional and non-presuppositional 
quantifiers are subject to Quantifier-Raising. Consider the following 
sentences. (31a) contains a Q-raised sok 'many' phrase. (31b) is a 
marked construction, with no Q-Raising performed (or, according to É. 
Kiss (1986), with the Q-raised quantifier scrambled back into the VP in 
PF) . The quantifier is ambiguous, having both a strong 
(presuppositional) and a weak (non-presuppositional) reading in both 
cases.
(31) a. [TopP Mari [jp sok diákot^ [IP meg- buktatott t-jJ ] ]
Mary many student-ACC PERF failed
'Mary failed many students. [The number of students that Mary 
failed was great./Mary failed a large part of the students.]' 
b. [TopP Mari [jP meg buktatott sok diákot]]
'Mary failed many students. [The number of students that Mary 
failed was great. /Mary failed a large part of the students.]'
Furthermore, languages with visible Q-Raising such as Hungarian also 
clearly demonstrate that generic plurals are not subject to Q-Raising; 
instead of being adjoined to the Predicate Phrase (IP) , they undergo 
Topicalization. Compare the syntactic positions of the generic plural in 
(32a) and the quantifier in (32b) relative to a sentence adverbial, 
whose rightmost possible position is between the topic and the Predicate
Phrase:
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(32)a. A diákok véleményem szerint szeretnek utazni.
the students in my opinion like to travel
'Students, in my opinion, like to travel.'
b. *Minden diák véleményem szerint szeret utazni.
every student in my opinion likes to travel
'Every student, in my opinion, likes to travel.'
c. Véleményem szerint minden diák szeret utazni.
The generic plural in (32a) is in [Spec,TopP], the landing site of 
Topicalization, whereas the universal quantifier in (32b) is adjoined to 
IP.
The fact that generic plurals undergo Topicalization rather than 
Q-Raising cannot be specific to languages in which generic plurals bear 
a definite article; as Krifka et al. (1993, section 2.5.) argue, a 
generic definite plural is semantically non-distinct from a generic bare 
plural.
I conclude that the sentence-internal distribution of existential 
and generic bare plurals across languages is more adequately explained 
on the basis of their specificity feature and the independently 
motivated Specificity Condition on Topicalization (24) than on the basis 
of their presuppositionality feature and an alleged presuppositionality 
requirement on Q-Raising.
The next question to consider is what the distribution of 
existential and generic bare plurals with respect to various classes of 
predicates depends on.
As a first step, let us summarize the facts that have to be 
accounted for.
(i) Predicates that mean 'exist (in a particular fashion and/or in a 
particular location)' allow the referent whose existence they assert to
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be represented by a [-specific] NP irrespective of whether its existence 
in the particular fashion and/or location is temporary or permanent - 
see (lOa-c) above and (33):
(33) a. There are active volcanoes in the Northern part of the country.
b. Misprints occur on every page of this book.
c. Problems exist.
d. Unfair deals are known to everybody.
e. Firemen are available/visible.
The preferred (or, in the case of (33a), the only) reading of the bare 
plural subjects is a [-specific], existential reading. (If the subjects 
were represented by singular indefinite NPs, their preferred reading 
would also be a [-specific] reading - as is clear e.g. in the case of A 
misprint occurs on every page of this book, where the referent of the 
misprint is likely to vary from page to page.)
ii. Verbal predicates describing an eventuality in the sense of Parsons 
(1990) (that is, activity, accomplishment, and achievement predicates) 
can also take an argument represented by a [-specific] NP. For example:
(34) a. Babies are crying.
b. Children ran across the street.
c. Journalists wanted to get acquainted with Mary.
Ü
I
B
I
J
G
Ü
D
G
EJ
I
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0
0
G
(35)a. Mary is teaching children.
b. Mary bought books.
c. Mary got acquainted with journalists.
I
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The sentences in (34a-c) contain a [-specific], existentially 
interpreted bare plural subject, whereas those in (35a-c) have a [- 
specific], existentially interpreted bare plural object.
iii. Adjectival predicates expressing the physical, mental or emotional 
state of their subject do not allow it to be represented by a [- 
specific] NP - unless the NP is contrastively focussed. For example:
(36) a. Children are dirty.
b. Shoes are shiny.
c. Girls are good at learning foreign languages.
Children in (36a) must either be interpreted as a [+specific], generic 
NP, in which case (36) means 'Children in general are dirty', or it must 
be interpreted contrastively focussed, in which case (36) means 'It is 
children that are dirty, not some other relevant groups of individuals,
e.g. adults.' In the latter case, the specificity feature of the NP 
children is not determined; it can be either [+specific], meaning 
'children in general', or [-specific], meaning 'some children'. The 
subjects of (36b,c) have similar options of interpretation.
iv. Verbal predicates expressing the physical, mental or emotional state 
of a referent do not allow an argument represented by a [-specific] NP, 
unless it is contrastively focussed. For example:
(37) a. Boys admire athletes, 
b. Athletes impress boys.
In (37a,b), both the subject and the object are are understood as 
[+specific] generic NPs, that is, both boys and athletes both in (37a)
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and in (37b) mean 'boys/athletes in general', not 'some boys/athletes' - 
unless they are contrastively focussed, as is clearly the case in 
(38a,b):
(38) a. John admires ATHLETES, not FILM STARS, 
b. ATHLETES impress John, not FILM STARS.
(38a) can mean either that John admires the kind 'athletes' as opposed 
to the kind 'film stars', or that 'the persons that John admires all 
happen to be athletes, not film stars'. Similarly, (38b) can mean either 
that it is the kind 'athletes' as opposed to the kind 'film stars' that 
impress John; or that 'those who impress John all happen to be athletes, 
not film stars'.
Predicates which are ambiguous between an activity reading and a 
stative reading license a [-specific] argument only under their activity 
reading - as was observed by Laca (1990). The progressive in (39) 
indicates that the predicate admire describes an activity, and, 
accordingly, its bare plural object is interpreted existentially.
(39) Mary is admiring athletes (in the lobby).
These generalizations suggest that it is the distribution of [- 
specific] bare plural NPs that is constrained; no classes of predicates 
disallow a [+specific] bare plural NP.4 Semantic considerations also 
lead us to the same conclusion. [+specific] indefinites have been argued 
by many to be referring expressions (for singular [+specific] 
indefinites, see Fodor and Sag (1982); for generic plural indefinites, 
see Carlson (1977; 1982)) and Heyer (1985), and for a subset of them, 
Krifka et al. (1993)5). Generic bare plurals have also been claimed to 
be variables bound by a generic operator; however, it has been assumed
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that their binder is a generally available default generic operator. [- 
specific] indefinites, on the other hand, are clearly variables in need 
of a binder. I hypothesize that existential and eventive predicates can 
take a [-specific] plural indefinite argument because they can provide a 
binder for it. The operators associated with existential and eventive 
predicates are obviously absent in the case of non-existential 
predicates expressing a state. The question, naturally, is what kind of 
operators they are.
Szabolcsi (1986) argues that the lexical meaning of all predicates 
expressing existence or availability (in a particular fashion) contains 
a meaning component EXIST, which can be identified with a logical 
operator of existence. It is presumably this operator that serves as the 
binder of the non-specific indefinite argument of existential 
predicates.6
The question still remains what enables predicates expressing an 
eventuality, as opposed to predicates expressing a state, to license a 
[-specific] indefinite. Parsons (1990), following Davidson (1967), 
attributes to all non-stative predicates an event argument, which is 
represented by a variable bound by an existential operator. It would be 
intuitively plausible to link the possibility of a [-specific] 
indefinite argument to the presence of an existentially bound event 
variable, assuming that the existential operator binding the event 
variable non-selectively also binds the indefinite NP arguments of the 
given predicate. After all, if there exists an event, its participants 
must also exist. The fact that the existential operator binding the 
event variable allows for more than one occurrence of the given event 
also fits in with the use of a [-specific] indefinite NP: the use of an 
indefinite has the effect that the denotation of the given NP can vary 
with every occurrence of the given event; for example, if Children 
shouted under my window, the denotation of children can be different at
26
every shouting event. Since stative predicates lack an event argument, 
in stative sentences no non-selective binder is available for the 
binding of a [-specific] indefinite.7
The fact that stative sentences do allow a [-specific] indefinite 
NP if it is contrastively focussed is not surprising if contrastive 
focus is analyzed as a logical operator, as suggested e.g. in Szabolcsi 
(1983); in such sentences it is presumably the focus operator that binds 
the [-specific] indefinite NP.
5. Summary
I have demonstrated that whether a bare plural subject is assigned a 
generic or an existential reading is not a consequence of the 
individual-level or stage-level nature of its predicate, contrary to 
Diesing's claim. In Diesing's theory, the explanation of the alleged 
correlation between the classification of predicates as individual-level 
or stage-level, and the interpretation of their bare plural subject as 
generic or existential is built on two sets of stipulations. The first 
one concerns syntactic structure. It is assumed that individual-level 
predicates, as opposed to stage-level ones, are associated with a 
particular kind of Infl: a control Infl, assigning a theta role to 
[Spec,IP], and controlling a PRO in [Spec,VP]. The second set of 
stipulations concern the mapping of the LF representations of sentences 
onto logical representations. It is assumed that the VP-external 
material is to be mapped into the restrictor of an operator, whereas the 
VP-internal material is to be mapped into the nuclear scope in a Heim- 
style tripartite logical structure. The fact that the consequences 
derived from these stipulations are empirically inadequate removes all 
the motivation for the control-type Infl hypothesized by Diesing, and
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also casts doubt on her proposal concerning the mapping of LF onto 
logical structure.8
The alternative account proposed in this paper has a wider 
coverage than Diesing's theory: it explains the distribution of plural 
indefinite subjects and objects alike, both within the sentence and with 
respect to various classes of predicates. The account is based on the 
independently motivated claim that generic bare plurals are [+specific], 
and existential bare plurals are [-specific]. The fact that [-specific] 
indefinite NPs are confined to the Predicate Phrase is derived from an 
independently existing specificity condition on Topicalization. It is 
argued that a [-specific] indefinite NP is licensed by predicates that 
can provide a binder for the variable that it represents. Two such 
predicate classes have been identified: predicates meaning existence, 
whose EXIST meaning component can function as a logical operator, and 
verbs expressing an eventuality, whose event argument is associated with 
an xistential operator that can function as a non-selective binder. 
Predicates not belonging to these two classes can take a [-specific] 
bare plural if it is bound by a contrastive focus operator.
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Notes
1 The following example of Kratzer (1980) is intended to prove that non­
generic bare NPs can have wide scope:
(i) John wanted to put salt in the dough because he 
confounded it with sugar.
But the wide scope salt in (i) is a contrastive focus; what has wide 
scope is the focus operator.
2 On syntactic predication, see Williams (1980) and Rothstein (1983).
3 Given that in the proposed framework, VP-internal generic plural 
objects are not forced to leave the VP in LF, the LF-position of a bare 
plural NP does not necessarily give a clue as to its generic or 
existential nature. This, however, cannot prevent the construction of 
the logical representation of the sentence; the specificity feature of 
the NP does provide the necessary information.
4 Except, of course, be in the there is construction. Hungarian is known 
to have a larger set of indefiniteness predicates - see Szabolcsi 
(1986); these, however, are all light verbs which need to incorporate an 
argument. They require a [-specific] argument because presumably only [- 
specific] NPs can be incorporated.
5 In arguing for the referential analysis of generic plurals, É. Kiss 
(1993) points out that generic plurals do not trigger any Weak Crossover 
effect. Compare:
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(i)a. Their  ^ subjects want to know everything about 
present-day monarchs-^.
b. Their^ future subjects want to know everything about 
Charles and Diana^.
c. *His-[ subjects want to know everything about every
present-day monarchy.
d. *HisjL subjects want to know everything about a
a monarchy.
The generic present-dav monarchs in (ia) can co-refer with the pronoun 
their without binding it; that is, it patterns with the referential 
Charles and Diana in (ib), instead of the universally quantified every 
present-dav monarch in (ic) or the generically bound a monarch in (id) .
A monarch in (id) can bind his only if it denotes a particular monarch, 
that is, if it is referential.
6 Szabolcsi (1986) also extends her claim to verbs of creation, whose 
meaning can be paraphrased as 'cause to exist in a particular location 
and/or in a particular fashion'. She points out, however, that in the 
case of verbs of creation, as well as in the case of existential 
predicates more complex than be, the EXIST meaning component can also be 
pushed into the background, and e.g. the 'in a particular fashion' 
component can be highlighted.
7 The event argument plays a different role in Kratzer's account of the 
distribution of generic and existential bare plural subjects (see 
Kratzer (1989)). She claims that stage-level predicates have an event 
argument, whereas individual level predicates that do not have one. That 
is, she attributes an event argument to a set of predicates overlapping 
with, but not identical to, the set of eventive predicates of e.g.
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Parsons (1990), including, among others, also adjectival predicates 
expressing a temporary state. In Kratzer's theory the event argument 
licenses a VP-internal subject by functioning as the external argument 
of the predicate, thus keeping the subject out of the Predicate-Phrase- 
external position.
8 Diesing's mapping hypothesis has also been criticized from a semantic 
point of view in de Swart (1993).
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